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Constitutional Limits on the Right of Government Investigators to Interview and
Examine Alleged Victims of Child Abuse or Neglect
Teri Dobbins Baxter

1

Abstract
Investigating allegations of child abuse or neglect presents unique challenges, particularly if parents or
guardians are the alleged perpetrators. Those accused of harming the children are in a position to prevent
the victims from getting access to the help they need to escape their abuser(s). The courts have not clearly
defined the federal constitutional boundaries of searches and seizures in this context. The Supreme Court,
in particular, has not weighed in on the constitutionality of warrantless searches and seizures in connection
with abuse and neglect investigations. This lack of Supreme Court guidance has led to unpredictable and
sometimes conflicting opinions from state and lower federal courts, particularly with respect to Fourth
Amendment requirements in this context. This Article will examine whether court orders allowing searches
and seizures in child abuse or neglect cases can be issued based on a standard lower than probable cause
and still pass muster under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, it discusses the special needs exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and weighs arguments in favor of and in opposition to
applying the special needs exception to child abuse and neglect investigations. Finally, the Article discusses
whether searches without a warrant or other court order may be conducted in response to allegations of
child abuse or neglect if the special needs exception does not apply.

Introduction
Government workers are tasked with investigating allegations of abuse or neglect
of children. It is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies to most investigative options
involving direct contact with the alleged victim. Interviews are searches 2 and taking
children into custody—even temporarily for the purpose of interviewing them—involves
a seizure. 3 What is unclear is under what circumstances these searches or seizures violate
the Fourth Amendment. There are cases that discuss rather extensively the right to
remove children from their parents’ custody without a warrant (requiring exigent or
emergency circumstances and, in some cases, evidence that there was no time to get a
court order). However, this Article focuses on the right to search or seize evidence. In
other words, to what extent can social workers investigate child abuse allegations without
consent or a warrant supported by probable cause?
Investigating allegations of child abuse or neglect presents unique challenges,
particularly if parents or guardians are the alleged perpetrators. Those accused of harming
∗

Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D. Duke University 1997; B.A. Duke
University 1993.
2
See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 509-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that investigation on school premises
that consisted of interviewing students “easily meets” the definition of a Fourth Amendment search
“because the defendants went to the school for the specific purpose of gathering information, an activity
that most certainly constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.”).
3
“A person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to
leave.” Heck, 327 F.3d at 510; see also Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that an interview of a child at her school was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes); Tennenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court holding that taking a child from her
school to the hospital for examination was a Fourth Amendment seizure).
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the children are in the perfect position to prevent the alleged victims from getting access
to the help they need to escape their abuser(s). In cases in which the reports of abuse or
neglect are insufficient to meet the standard of probable cause necessary to issue a
warrant, there may not be a meaningful investigation. Without the ability to search
interview or examine the children (both of which constitute searches under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution), the government may be unable to assess
whether the allegations of abuse or neglect can be substantiated, much less meet the
burden of proof necessary to remove children from an abusive or neglectful environment.
This can be particularly troubling in cases in which there is little or no opportunity to
gather evidence because the children have limited contact with persons other than the
alleged abusers. For example, children who live in a geographically isolated or culturally
insular community may have limited contact with people who are willing and able to
observe and report signs of abuse. If abuse is suspected, the information gathered may be
insufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant. Even if
the child regularly interacts with teachers, administrators, child care providers, or others
who may be inclined or required to report suspected abuse, there may not be sufficient
evidence to justify issuance of a warrant to search or seize the child. In other words,
without evidence of abuse, the authorities may be unable to obtain evidence to prove
abuse.
On the other hand, giving investigators an unrestricted right to seize and examine
or interview children would be an unnecessary and unwise erosion of Fourth Amendment
rights, especially when those searches and seizures take place at the alleged victim’s
home. Moreover, research has shown that investigations, particularly those that are
unnecessarily intrusive or that separate children from their caregivers, can be traumatic
and psychologically harmful to the children as well as damaging to the family as a
whole. 4
While child abuse investigations are typically subject to detailed state regulations,
the courts have not clearly defined the federal constitutional boundaries of searches and
seizures in this context. The Supreme Court, in particular, has not weighed in on the
constitutionality of warrantless searches and seizures in connection with abuse and
neglect investigations. This lack of Supreme Court guidance has led to unpredictable and
sometimes conflicting opinions from state and lower federal courts, particularly with
respect to Fourth Amendment requirements in this context. Despite the lack of agreement
on every issue, a general consensus seems to have developed on some questions, such as
strip searches in the home without parental consent. Other issues have divided the courts
and result in uncertainty for those conducting the investigations and for families that are
the targets of such investigations.
In addition to clarifying the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment and its
requirements in the context of child abuse investigations, there is a pressing need for
guidance for investigators as well as state legislatures in this area. In some cases,
investigators have acted pursuant to statutes that purport to give them authority to
4

See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a
Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413 (2005).
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question children under circumstances that were later held to be unconstitutional. 5 Now
that several circuits have agreed on the broad contours of the Fourth Amendment and the
necessity of obtaining a warrant or equivalent court order in the absence of consent or
exigent circumstances, there is an even greater need to explore what actions are allowed
if such a warrant cannot be obtained, as well as what types of searches should be
authorized in the warrant or order.
This Article will begin with a general overview of the procedures for investigating
allegations of abuse and neglect in Illinois and Texas. These procedures will serve as
representative samples of the processes used across the country and will provide context
for the Fourth Amendment issues and arguments discussed in the cases and later sections
of the Article. Part II then discusses the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in the
context of abuse and neglect investigations.
In Part III, I will examine whether court orders allowing searches and seizures in
child abuse or neglect cases can be issued based on a standard lower than probable cause
and still pass muster under the Fourth Amendment. Part IV discusses the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and weighs arguments in
favor of and in opposition to applying the special needs exception to child abuse and
neglect investigations. Part V discusses whether warrantless searches may be conducted
in response to allegations of child abuse or neglect if the special needs exception does not
apply. Additionally, Part V explores what actions are reasonable while interviewing or
examining children in the context of a warrantless search.
I.

Child Abuse and Neglect Investigations

Procedures for conducting child abuse and neglect investigations are established
by state law. The procedures vary from state to state, although there tend to be many
similarities. The procedures for Illinois and Texas will be examined below in order to
establish a general understanding of the types of procedures that are typically employed
across the nation and to provide context for some of the cases and issues that are
discussed in later sections of the Article. 6
A.

Illinois

Report to State Central Register
In Illinois, all reports of child abuse or neglect (CA/N) are made to the State
Central Register (SCR). 7 Reports can be made 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to the
telephone hotline or local Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) offices. 8
5

See, e.g., Doe v. Heck (7th Cir.).
The discussion of the Illinois and Texas procedures are intended to provide an overview and not a
comprehensive or exhaustive explanation of the statutes or procedures in effect in either jurisdiction.
7
Illinois Reports of Child Abuse and Neglect Procedures (“Procedures”) P.T. 2010.22 § 300.20(a).
8
Id. The hotline number is 1-800-25A-BUSE. Reports to the hotline go directly to the SCR. Id. If
someone calls a local office to make a CA/N report will be encouraged to call the hotline to make the
6
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Reports are screened by call floor workers who complete a State Automated Child
Welfare Information System (SACWIS) intake form. 9 The call worker must also elicit
additional information, including: the reasons why the reporter has reasonable cause to
believe that abuse or neglect has occurred and the source of the information acquired by
the reporter; any knowledge regarding the risk of harm to the child; any identified safety
issues; knowledge of any potential danger to DCFS investigators; knowledge of the
mental and physical condition of the alleged perpetrator; knowledge about the child,
family, or perpetrator’s ability to communicate with the investigation specialist (i.e.,
language barriers, hearing impairment); identity and location of possible witnesses to, or
persons with knowledge of the alleged abuse or neglect; and directions to any relevant
addresses. 10
Not every call or allegation of neglect or abuse will qualify as a “report of child
abuse or neglect.” In order for a CA/N report to be taken, specified criteria must be met,
including a requirement that the reporter have “reasonable cause to believe” that a child
has been abused or neglected, that the alleged victim be less than 18 years of age, and the
alleged victim must either have been harmed or be in substantial risk of harm. 11 If the
CA/N report criteria are met and the allegations fit the definition of child abuse or neglect
in the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (ANCRA), an initial investigation will
be conducted. 12 The rules do not specifically address anonymous reports. 13 Presumably,
report. Id. Individuals who go to local offices to report child abuse or neglect will be directed to and
assisted with making a report to the hotline. Id.
9
Id. at 300.30(a). “Incidents of suspected child abuse or neglect reported to the Department are classified
as physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect or a combination of the preceding three and recorded in the State
Central Register’s Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System (SACWIS). The SACWIS
enables the Department to identify and locate prior reports of child abuse or neglect; monitor the current
status of reports of child abuse or neglect being provided services under the Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Act; and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of existing laws and programs through statistical
analysis and other information.” Procedures Appendix B (a).
10
Procedures at § 300.30(a).
11
Id. at § 300.30(a)(2). The complete list of criteria is as follows:
• The reporter must have reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused or neglected;
and
• The alleged victim must be less than 18 years of age; and
• The alleged victim must either have been harmed or must be in substantial risk of harm; and
• There must be a specific abusive or neglectful incident which falls within the description of an
allegation which caused the harm to the child, or a set of circumstances that lead a reasonable
person to believe that a child is at risk of harm; and
• If the allegations presented were true, the situation would constitute abuse or neglect as defined
in Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (ANCRA) and as interpreted in the allegations
definitions contained in Procedures 300, Appendix B.
• For abuse, the alleged perpetrator must be the child's parent, immediate family member, any
individual who resides in the same home as the child, any person who is responsible for the child's
welfare at the time of the incident, or the paramour of the child's parent, or any person who came
to know the child through an official capacity or position of trust. Alleged perpetrators of abuse
must be over ten years of age.
• For neglect, the alleged perpetrator must be the child's parent or any other person that is over the
age of ten years who was responsible for the child at the time of the alleged neglect.
12
Id. at 300.30(a).
13
In fact, the only time anonymous reports are mentioned is in Appendix B to the Procedures addressing
allegations of inadequate supervision. In that section, it states in the case of an anonymous report, “an

4
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reports from an anonymous source will be taken and investigated in the same manner as
other reports, although it may be more difficult to assess the credibility of anonymous
sources. 14
CA/N reports are then placed in one of nine categories: (1) emergency; (2)
normal; (3) child 5 years of age or less; (4) child currently alone/unsupervised; (5)
immediate medical attention needed; (6) child dead; (7) facility report; (8) child held by
police/physician; (9) other/action needed. 15 Each category has an associated required
response. 16 Reports that are placed in the normal response category require a response
within 24 hours. 17 An emergency response is required if a child is in immediate danger of
physical harm or it is likely that the family of an alleged child victim will flee with the
child. 18 In those circumstances, SCR must call the local police and the investigation
specialist must respond immediately by initiating an investigation “without delay at any
hour of the day or night.” 19
Initial Investigation
DCFS staff members that have been designated as Investigation Specialists
conduct the investigations of CA/N reports. 20 “The purpose of the initial investigation is
to determine whether a report of alleged child abuse or neglect is a good faith indication
of potential abuse or neglect and, therefore, warrants a formal investigation.”21
Investigation Specialists must complete a list of activities during the initial investigation,
including: review of the intake and any prior indicated or unfounded investigations on
file; develop an investigative plan with the Investigative Supervisor and law enforcement,
if appropriate; in-person contact with the alleged victim or victims; interview the alleged
victim or victims, reporters, and other persons with information; and verify the identity of
alleged perpetrators, adult household members, and frequent adult visitors to the home. 22
interview must be conducted with an individual (collateral) who has (or would likely have) knowledge of
the family situation and/or reported incident.” Procedures at Appendix B, Allegation: Inadequate
Supervision (c)(2)(J).
14
See Procedures Appendix B (b) Credibility of Evidence.
15
Procedures at § 300.30(h)(2).
16
Procedures Appendix B at § 300.30(b).
17
Id. at § 300.30(b)(2)(A).
18
Id. at § 300.30(b).
19
Id. at § 300.30(b)(1).
20
Id. at § 300.50.
21
Id. at § 300.50(a).
22
Id. at § 300.50(a). The complete list of mandatory investigative activities is as follows:
• Review the intake, and prior indicated and unfounded investigations on file.
• Review the contact and evidence requirements for current allegations.
• Develop an investigative plan with Investigation Supervisor and law enforcement, if appropriate, to
ensure required contacts are completed and evidence is gathered.
• Initiate the report within the 24-hour mandate in accordance with subsection 300.50(c) by in-person
contacts or good faith attempts.
• In-person contact with the alleged victim or victims.
• In-person examination of the child victim or victims’ environment.
• Interview the alleged child victims or victims, reporters, other persons with information, and other
identified persons to obtain information pertaining to the alleged incident of abuse or neglect.

5
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The investigation must be initiated by either in-person contact with the alleged
victim or victims within 24 hours of the receipt of the report or by a “good faith attempt
to contact the alleged victim or victims.” 23 The interview of the victim must be conducted
in accordance with specific procedures developed for different types of harm. 24 “The
interviews shall be conducted out of the presence of the child’s caretaker and the alleged
perpetrator if at all possible. . . . Another person whom the child trusts but who is not the
alleged perpetrator or another alleged child victim . . . may be present during the
interview if it will make the child more comfortable.” 25 Investigation Specialists are to
contact the parents or caretakers in person on the same day that the alleged child victims
are interviewed. If contact is not possible at that time, “the contact must be attempted no
later than 24 hours after the Investigation Specialist observes and assesses the safety of
the children. 26
Observation of the Child
In addition to interviewing the child, it may be necessary for the Investigation
Specialist to examine the child to verify or refute allegations of injury. 27 If the report
alleges external marks or injuries as a result of neglect or abuse and, based on the
information obtained from the investigation or other credible sources, there is “reasonable
cause to believe that an observation will reveal marks/injuries supporting the
allegation,” 28 the investigator should attempt to view those marks or injuries only in the
presence of a parent, guardian, or other professional person (preferably of the same sex as
the child). 29 If the investigator discovers information indicating that the child has
• Observe the alleged victim or victims in accordance with the requirements of subsection 300.50(c)(9).
• Verify identification of alleged perpetrators, adult household members, and frequent adult visitors to
the home through Social Security Numbers and photographic identifications (e.g., driver’s license,
employee identification).
• Complete data checks on members of the household.
• Complete Law Enforcement Agencies Data Systems (LEADS) check in accordance with
Administrative Procedure #6.
• Complete required minimal investigative activities for the alleged allegation that are identified in
Procedures 300, Appendix B.
• Document all investigative activities within 24-hours after they are completed.
23
Id. at § 300.50(c).
24
Id.. Different reporting and investigation procedures are set out for death; head injuries; internal injuries;
burns, poisons/noxious substances; wounds; bone fractures; substantial risk of physical injury/environment
injurious to health and welfare; cuts, bruises, abrasions, and oral injuries; human bites, sprains/dislocations;
tying/close confinement; substance misuse; torture, mental and emotional impairment; sexually transmitted
diseases; sexual penetration; sexual exploitation; sexual molestation; substantial risk of sexual injury;
inadequate supervision; abandonment/desertion; inadequate food; inadequate shelter; inadequate clothing;
medical neglect; failure to thrive (non-organic); environmental neglect; malnutrition (non-organic). Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at § 300.50(c)(10). If the children are judged to be safe and the alleged perpetrators are not the
parents or caretakers, the Investigation Specialist shall contact the alleged perpetrator within 7 calendars
days of the initial report. Id. Contact can be delayed at the request of law of law enforcement. Id.
27
Id. at § 300.50(c)(9).
28
Id. at § 300.50 (c)(9)(A). “A report by a mandated reporter shall be deemed to be ‘reasonable cause’
under this paragraph.” Id. at § 300.50 (c)(9)(A)(iii).
29
Id. at 300.50(c)(9)(A).

6
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external marks or injuries on other parts of the child’s body, those marks or injuries
should also be observed. 30 If the marks or injuries are on a part of the body that would
normally covered by a bikini bathing suit, the observing investigator must be of the same
sex as the child. 31 If the child to be observed is verbal, the investigator should explain the
purpose of the observation in words that the child can understand. 32
If the child’s clothes must be “adjusted or removed” in order for the investigator
to observe the alleged marks or injuries, the investigator should “make a good faith
effort” to get the parent or guardian’s consent to the observation. 33 If the parent or
guardian is not present at the place where the observation is to take place, the investigator
must attempt to notify the parent or guardian of the necessity of observing the child for
external marks or injuries. 34 The investigator must call any emergency numbers left by
the parent or guardian and must consult local telephone books and directory assistance if
the parent or guardian has not left any emergency numbers or cannot be reached at those
numbers. 35
If the parent or guardian is located but refuses to cooperate with the investigator
or allow observation of the child, the investigator must notify the parent that the
investigator has a “responsibility” to observe the child. 36 The investigator must then offer
the following options:
1. The parent/guardian may take the child to a physician or hospital
emergency room for a physical examination within a reasonable time.
The Investigation Specialist will secure a written report from the
examining physician; or
2. The parent/guardian may give consent to allow the Investigation
Specialist and another professional (e.g., a school nurse, school
teacher, policeman, etc.) to observe the child. 37
If the parent or guardian still refuses to cooperate or allow the observation of
external marks or injuries and “the Investigation Specialist determines that the child is in
imminent risk of harm if left in the custody of the parent/guardian, the Investigation
Specialist shall take the child into protective custody and proceed to have the child
examined by a physician.” 38 If there is no imminent harm, the child may not be observed
or taken into custody. 39 If internal injuries are alleged, the child must be taken to a

30

Id. at § 300.50 (c)(9)(A)(iii).
Id.
32
Id. at § 300.50 (c)(9).
33
Id. at § 300.50 (c)(9)(A)(iii). Those efforts may include (but are not limited to) a request for the parent or
guardian’s assistance with moving or removing the child’s clothes. Id. Compliance with the request is
apparently deemed to be consent to the observation.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
31
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physician for examination. 40 “An Investigation Specialist shall never attempt to examine
an alleged child victim for internal injuries or attempt to move a child with internal
injuries.” 41
Allegations of sexual abuse are handled differently. 42 “Investigation Specialists
will not physically examine any child alleged to have been sexually abused. Investigators
must follow local office procedures to arrange for the child’s medical examination and
treatment.” 43 If advocacy center resources are not available at a particular field office,
“the Investigation Specialist must notify law enforcement and the State’s Attorney to
coordinate a multidisciplinary investigation.” 44
The initial investigation should be completed within 14 days. 45 If, at the end of
the initial investigation, it is determined that: the alleged victim is not less than 18 years
of age; or the alleged victim was not harmed and is not in substantial risk of harm; or the
allegations do not fit the statutory definition of neglect or abuse; or there is no “eligible
perpetrator” as defined by statute, then the report is determined to be “not good faith
report of potential abuse or neglect, and the investigation is discontinued.” 46 Those
reports are categorized as “unfounded.” 47 If the initial investigation reveals that
reasonable cause exists to believe that child abuse or neglect exists, then the report is
“indicated” and a formal investigation must be conducted. 48 A report is “unqualified” if
the investigation determines that there is “not an alleged victim and/or eligible perpetrator
of potential abuse or neglect.” 49
Referrals to Law Enforcement
Law enforcement may become involved in a CA/N investigation in many ways.
“The Investigation Specialist shall notify the appropriate law enforcement agency and the
State’s Attorney of the receipt of reports of Death, Physical Abuse and Sexual Abuse
Harms . . . . This notification shall take place at the commencement of the initial
investigation.” 50 The rules list several reasons for prompt notification, including notifying
law enforcement of a possible criminal act, requesting assistance in protecting the child
40

Id. at § 300.50 (c)(9)(B). The Investigation Specialist shall attempt to get the parent or guardian’s
cooperation and consent to taking the child for examination and treatment by a physician. Id. If the parent
cannot be contacted or refuses to take the child for examination and the child is in imminent risk of harm,
the child shall be taken into protective custody and the Investigation Specialist shall have the child taken to
a hospital emergency room for examination. Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at § 300.50 (c)(9)(C). “Child advocacy centers are available to a number of Department field offices
to provide a coordinated multidisciplinary approach to the identification, treatment, and legal aspects of
sexual abuse allegations in accordance with the Children’s Advocacy Center Act.” Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at § 300.50(k).
46
Id.
47
Id. at § 300.50(l).
48
Id. at § 300.50(k).
49
Id. at § 300.50(m).
50
Id. at § 300.50(e).
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and the Investigations Specialist, and requesting their assistance in preserving evidence
and conducting the investigation. 51
In some circumstances, law enforcement may take the lead in an investigation. If
law enforcement is investigating the incident that is the basis of the CA/N report received
by DCFS, that investigation may pre-empt the DCFS investigation. 52 The Investigative
Specialist may choose to delegate the initiation of an investigation to law enforcement.
For example, a report may be delegated if the “law enforcement agency is already
involved in the situation, an officer had in-person contact with the alleged child victim”
no longer than one hour prior to or within 24 hours after the date and time the CA/N
report was received, and “the officer can attest to the current condition and safety of the
alleged child victim.” 53 Neither preemption nor delegation relieves the Investigation
Specialist of the “responsibility for assuring the safety of the alleged child victim,
interviewing the alleged child victim during the course of the investigation, and meeting
all investigative and documentation requirements.” 54 Finally, DCFS may conduct
investigate in cooperation with or parallel to a law enforcement investigation. 55
B.

Texas

The Child Protective Services Division (CPS) of the Texas Department of Family
and Protective Services (DFPS) is responsible for investigating reports of abuse or
neglect of children. 56 Reports can be made to the DFPS Statewide Intake (SWI) hotline
24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 57 Non-emergency situations can also be reported on the
DFPS website. 58 While online reports may be made at any time, it takes up to 24 hours
for those reports to be processed. Moreover, reporters must create an account and login
(or login as a guest) to access the reporting website. 59 Anonymous reports can be made
to the hotline. 60
SWI intake workers gather as much information from the reporter as possible to
determine wither the report meets the criteria for CPS investigation and assessment. 61 If
the case is referred to CPS it is assigned an initial level of priority based on the perceived
current risk to the child. 62 If the report indicates that a child faces an immediate risk of

51

Id.
Id. at § 300.50(c)(1).
53
Id. at § 300.50(c)(2).
54
Id.
55
Id. at § 300.50 (c)(3)-(4).
56
http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Child_Protection/About_Child_Protective_Services/
57
CPS Handbook at § 2000;
58
http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Contact_Us/report_abuse.asp
59
http://www.txabusehotline.org/Login/Default.aspx
60
Id.
61
CPS Handbook at § 2110.
62
Id. A CPS supervisor, SWI supervisor, or CPS investigation screener reviews the report and approves or
changes the intake worker’s decision. Id. The supervision or screener must document reasons for changing
the intake worker’s decision. Id.
52
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serious harm or death, the report is designated Priority 1 (P1). 63 If a report is accepted for
investigation but does not qualify as P1, then it is assigned as Priority 2 (P2). 64 The final
category is Priority None (PN) which applies to reports in which: there does not appear to
be a reasonable likelihood that a child will be abused or neglected in the foreseeable
future; the allegations are too vague or general to determine whether a child has been, or
is likely to be, abused or neglected; or the report does not give enough information to
locate the child’s family or household. 65
Initial Investigation
The purpose of investigating reports of abuse is to protect children. 66 In most
cases, the CPS worker will conduct a “thorough investigation,” 67 which requires the
following actions by the worker:
• Check the abuse and neglect backgrounds of every member of the
family and home, unless an exception to this requirement is met;
• Interview and examine each alleged victim;
• Interview and examine other children in the home who may have
been abused or neglected but were not named as alleged victims in
the intake report;
• Interview each of the alleged victim's parents who are living in the
home. If both parents (or the only parent) in the home are alleged
perpetrators, then the worker must also interview a collateral with
relevant information or a principal who is not an alleged victim or
perpetrator;
• Interview each alleged perpetrator, unless an exception to this
requirement is met;
• Visit the home, unless the worker can confirm or rule out the abuse
or neglect without the visit; and

63

CPS Handbook at § 2142. A report will also qualify as P1 if the report alleges abuse or neglect within 12
months after a prior investigation was closed as “Unable to Complete,” or if the report alleges the death of
a child due to abuse or neglect (regardless of whether there are surviving children in the house). Id.
The handbook lists (among others) the following examples of P1 reports: a child has sustained a serious
physical injury from the alleged abuse or neglect; a child is alleged to be sexually abused and in immediate
danger of further abuse; a preschool child is left alone; a child is abandoned or totally without parental
supervision, family resources, personal resources, or community support. No responsible adult is close by
to offer limited supervision, and the child is in immediate danger of serious physical harm; a child is in
immediate danger of death or serious physical harm because the child lacks basic physical necessities or
medical attention as a result of alleged neglect; child's caretaker behaves in a bizarre, psychotic, or
extremely intoxicated or drugged manner and abuse or neglect is alleged. Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at § 2142.
66
CPS Handbook at § 2210 (citing Texas Family Code § 261.301(d)).
67
CPS Handbook at § 2224. Alternative investigations types include “abbreviated investigations,” which
begin as thorough investigations but are truncated when circumstances indicate that a thorough
investigation is unnecessary; “unable to complete investigations,” which are appropriate when the family
cannot be located or refuse to cooperate with the investigation; and “preliminary investigations,” which
must be closed because CPS lacks jurisdiction. Id.
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•

Check the criminal background of each alleged perpetrator, unless
an alleged perpetrator is a child who is also alleged to be a victim.
These actions should be completed within 30 days after the date of the intake. 68
If an anonymous report of child abuse or neglect is made to DCFS, “the
department shall conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is any
evidence to corroborate the report.” 69 The preliminary investigation may include a visit to
the child’s home, an interview of the child, parents, and anyone else with relevant
knowledge, and an examination of the child.70 “Unless the department determines that
there is some evidence to corroborate the report of abuse, the department may not
conduct the thorough investigation required by this chapter or take any action against the
person accused of abuse.” 71
The interview of the alleged victim may take place at any reasonable time and
place, including the child’s home or school. 72 In order to interview the child at home, the
worker must obtain the parent’s consent. 73 Interviews may also be conducted at the
child’s school. If the parent is present at the school when the CPS worker seeks to
interview the child, the parent must consent to the interview. If the parent is not present
but has already refused to give DCFS consent to interview the child, then CPS workers
may not interview the child at school. 74 If the parent is not present at the school and has
not already refused consent, the worker may interview the child. If the parent refuses to
grant consent to the interview at home or school, the worker must seek a court order,
which will be granted “for good cause shown.” 75 If exigent circumstances exist, the
worker can remove the child from the home or school without a court order. 76

68

Id. at § 2270. All investigation activities should be documented and submitted for supervisor approval
within 45 days after the date of the intake, and the investigation should be approved and closed within 60
days after the date of the intake. Id.
69
Texas Family Code at § 261.304(a).
70
Id. at § 261.304(b).
71
Id. at § 261.304(c).
72
CPS Handbook at § 2241.
73
Id. at § 2241.1. Consent must be voluntary and not due to coercion or duress. Id. at § 2245.14 “The
standard is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would believe he or she is free to refuse
consent.” Id. Consent to interview the child does not give the worker the right to search the entire home
unless exigent circumstances exist. Id. at § 2245.17. “A caseworker can search closets and other areas of
the home that the parents have not given consent to search only when: exigent circumstances are present;
and the search is necessary to avoid immediate danger to the child.” Id.
74
Id. at § 2241.1.
75
“If admission to the home, school, or any place where the child may be cannot be obtained, then for good
cause shown the court having family law jurisdiction shall order the parent, the person responsible for the
care of the children, or the person in charge of any place where the child may be to allow entrance for the
interview, examination, and investigation.” Texas Family Code at § 261.303(b).
76
Id. at § 2241.1. “Exigent circumstances to enter a home exist only when the worker and supervisor
determine that: CPS has evidence that a child is in immediate danger; and CPS’s purpose for entering the
home is to prevent immediate danger and protect the child. If the child would be safe during a delay to
gather more information or obtain a court order, then exigent circumstances are not present.” Id. at §
2245.2.
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The interview must be an in-person, face-to-face interview and should normally
be conducted in private without any third parties present. 77 A third party may be present
if their presence will improve the quality of the interview or make the child feel more
comfortable, but not if their presence will compromise the integrity of the investigation.78
All interviews must be audio or video taped. 79 “The worker follows protocol to keep the
number of interviews with a child to a minimum, while also being thorough, and
exercises professional judgment and expertise in determining the nature, extent, and
number of interviews and examinations.” 80
The worker may also need to examine the alleged victim and any other children in
the home for signs of abuse or neglect. 81 All observations from the examinations must be
documented by photographs. 82 If the parent is present, the parent must consent to the
examination. 83 If the parent refuses to give consent, then the worker can seek a court
order. 84 When the examination involves areas “under the child’s clothing” workers are
advised to take precautions and be sensitive to the age and gender of the child. 85
“Caseworkers must never conduct sexual abuse examinations themselves . . . .” 86
Such examinations may only be conducted by medical professions and with the consent
of a parent. 87 If the parent refuses to give consent, the examination can only be conducted
if a court order is obtained. 88
At the end of the investigation the worker must assign a disposition to each allegation
included on the intake. 89 The two primary dispositions are:
• Reason to Believe — based on a preponderance of evidence, CPS concludes that
abuse or neglect has occurred; and
• Ruled Out — based on the available information, CPS determines that it is
reasonable to conclude that the abuse or neglect has not occurred. “‘Available
information,’ in the context of the ‘ruled out’ disposition, is the evidence that the
worker gathered through the required and supplemental actions he or she took to
conduct a thorough or an abbreviated investigation.” 90

77

Id. at § 2241.2.
Id.
79
Id; Texas Family Code at § 261.302(e).
80
Id. at § 2241.2.
81
Id. at § 2250.
82
Id. at 2251.1.
83
Id. at 2251.1.
84
Id.
85
Id. “The younger the child, the more likely it is to be necessary to visually inspect the child, particularly
if he or she is non-verbal. . . . The examination must be done by a worker of the same gender as the child,
whenever possible. If this is not possible, at a minimum, the caseworker must have another adult (such as
another caseworker, a school nurse, a teacher, a parent, and so on) present throughout the examination.” Id.
86
Id. at 2251.2.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at § 2271.
90
Id. at § 2271. The remaining dispositions are:
78
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If there are multiple allegations, then an overall disposition is assigned based upon the
separate dispositions for each allegation. 91
Cooperation with Law Enforcement
The Texas Family Code requires law enforcement to refer all reports of child
abuse or neglect to DCFS and likewise requires DCFS to refer all reports of child abuse
or neglect to law enforcement. 92 The role of CPS is civil and CPS policies are intended to
clarify the role of CPS and its responsibility for protecting children. 93 CPS staff “must
not act as law enforcement agents . . . by gathering evidence or talking to parents,

Unable to Complete: Before staff could draw a conclusion, the persons involved in the
allegation moved and could not be located, or the family refused to cooperate with the
investigation.
Unable to Determine: Staff conclude that:
• there is not a preponderance of the evidence that abuse or neglect occurred;
• it is not reasonable to conclude that abuse or neglect has not occurred; and
• the family did not move and become unable to locate before the worker could draw a
conclusion about the allegation.
Preliminary Investigations (Administrative Closure): Information received after a
case was assigned for investigation reveals that continued CPS intervention is
unwarranted as outlined in Item 2224.4 Preliminary Investigations (Administrative
Closure).
Merged in Error: Two cases with open investigations can be merged in error. When the
case is subsequently split, the IMPACT system will not allow the worker to delete the
allegations added from the "merged from" case to the "merged to" case. Therefore, the
worker must review the Allegation window of the formerly "merged to" investigation and
give the disposition of "merged in error" to allegations that should no longer be a part of
the investigation.
91

Id.

Each disposition the worker gives to an individual allegation is considered when
determining the overall investigation disposition, as is indicated below:
• Reason to believe. If any allegation disposition is "reason to believe," the overall case
disposition is "reason to believe."
• Unable to determine. If any allegation disposition is "unable to determine" and no
allegation disposition is "reason to believe," the overall case disposition is "unable to
determine."
• Unable to Complete. If any allegation disposition is "unable to complete" and no
allegation disposition is "reason to believe" or "unable to determine," the overall
investigation disposition is "unable to complete."
• Ruled out. If all allegation dispositions are "ruled out," the overall case disposition is
"ruled out."
• Administrative closure. If all allegation dispositions are "administrative closure," the
overall disposition is "administrative closure."
Id. at § 22.71.1.
92
Texas Family Code at § 261.105. “(a) All reports received by a local or state law enforcement agency
that allege abuse or neglect by a person responsible for a child's care, custody, or welfare shall be referred
immediately to the department or the designated agency. (b) The department or designated agency shall
immediately notify the appropriate state or local law enforcement agency of any report it receives, other
than a report from a law enforcement agency, that concerns the suspected abuse or neglect of a child or
death of a child from abuse or neglect.” Id.
93
Id. at § 2510.
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children, or collaterals for the sole purpose of criminal investigation.” 94 CPS staff will
provide law enforcement with information collected during the civil investigation, testify
at criminal hearings, and otherwise cooperate with law enforcement. 95 Of particular
import is the requirement that DCFS conduct a joint investigation with law enforcement
whenever the intake “alleges that a child has been or may be the victim of conduct that
constitutes a criminal offense that poses an immediate risk of physical or sexual abuse of
a child that could result in the death of or serious harm to the child.” 96
II.

Warrant Issued Upon Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is intended to ensure that a neutral
party has reviewed the evidence and concluded that the sanctity of the home or the
privacy rights of the individual are not intruded upon arbitrarily. 97 The warrant
requirement—or at least the requirement that searches or seizures be conducted based on
probable cause—should not be dispensed with lightly, even when government officials
are trying to protect vulnerable children. Consequently, as a matter of policy, if the
allegations or evidence already obtained by the would-be searchers establish probable
cause that a crime has been or is about to be committed, a warrant or equivalent court
order should be obtained (absent exigent circumstances or consent).
“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” 98 A
warrant may not be issued solely based on conclusory statements in an affidavit. 99
“Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions
of others.” 100 Several courts have held that a court order is equivalent to a warrant for
Fourth Amendment purposes in child abuse and neglect investigations. 101
94

Id.
Id.
96
Texas Family Code at § 261.301(f).
97
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967).
98
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
99
Id. at 239.
100
Id.
101
See Tennenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir. 1999) (“In the context of a seizure of a child
by the State during an abuse investigation, as the district court recognized, . . . a court order is the
equivalent of a warrant. ”). It is interesting to note that state laws may authorize issuance of a court order
based upon something other than probable cause. For example, in Texas, a family law court may order the
parent or guardian to allow entry into the home and interview of the child based upon a showing of “good
cause.” Roe v. Texas, 299 F.3d 395 footnote 15. But see Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 footnote
19 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Oregon statutes which allow caseworkers to obtain a court order for an in-school
interview by submitting an affidavit stating facts that constitute probable cause that a child has been
abused); Tennenbaum v. Williams, 862 F.Supp. 962, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that reasonable cause in
family court proceedings is equivalent to probable cause in criminal proceedings).
95
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If the allegations and evidence are not sufficient to establish probable cause, then the
following questions must be answered: (1) Should something less than probable cause be
sufficient for a warrant to be issued in child abuse or neglect investigations? (2) Does the
“special needs” exception to the warrant requirement apply? (3) Is a warrantless search
permissible in the absence of the special needs exception, probable cause, or exigent
circumstances?
III.

Court Order Based on Less than Probable Cause

In very limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has authorized searches based
on something less than probable cause. 102 In Stafford Unified School District v.
Redding, 103 the Court referenced its holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O that a lesser standard
should apply to searches of students in a public school setting.
In T.L.O., we recognized that the school setting “requires some
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a
search,” 469 U.S., at 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, and held that for searches by
school officials “a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,” id., at 341,
105 S.Ct. 733. We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to
determine the legality of a school administrator's search of a student, id., at
342, 345, 105 S.Ct. 733, and have held that a school search “will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,” id., at 342, 105
S.Ct. 733.104
While this language appears to authorize searches based on reasonable suspicion
under some circumstances, the T.L.O. case has been regarded as the first recognition of
the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 105 To the
extent that courts have already rejected application of the “special needs” exception, this
case or its successors cannot be relied as sanctioning searches based on reasonable
suspicion instead of probable cause.
However, rejecting the special needs exception does not bar courts from
recognizing that while child abuse and neglect investigations do not fit easily within the
rationale underlying that exception, the need to protect children provides a justification
for recognizing a different exception to the warrant requirement. The standard applied in
102

See Stafford Unified School Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009).
Id.
104
Id. (citing and quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984)).
105
See T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (“Only in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable, is the court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers.”).
103
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abuse and neglect cases need not be identical to the special needs standard, and could be
tailored to fit the circumstances raised by abuse and neglect cases.
The need for a less rigorous standard for child abuse investigative searches exists
because there may be no means by which social workers can evaluate abuse allegations
without conducting a search of the home or an interview with the children. This is
particularly true if the parents or guardians are the alleged perpetrators and if the children
are isolated from other members of society. For instance, a young child may not attend
school or pre-school and may have little or no contact with adults other than the
potentially abusive parent(s). Consequently, there may be little or no opportunity to
investigate abuse or neglect allegations without the cooperation of the parents (which is
unlikely if the allegations are true) or the ability to search the home or interview the
child. Obtaining a warrant may likewise be impossible. A report of abuse may not
provide sufficient information to qualify as probable cause to support issuance of a search
warrant. Absent some other authority to investigate the allegations, no investigation may
take place.
Parents have understandably objected to a lower standard, arguing that the
government’s right to interfere in their decisions as parents must be limited. 106 While this
viewpoint is valid, it does not address the need to protect children from parents who are
harming, or allowing others to harm, their children. A standard that balances privacy
interests with the need to protect those unable to protect themselves is necessary to
protect rights without unnecessarily sacrificing the safety of children.
This balance can be struck by requiring investigators to obtain a court order to
interview children, but requiring only reasonable belief instead of probable cause for the
issuance of the order. Because the government worker would still need to present facts to
a judge (a neutral party) in order to obtain the order, workers are protected and will not
bear the burden of relying on their own judgment in difficult cases. More important, it
protects the parents and children that are the targets of investigation. While perhaps more
burdensome than warrantless searches, this middle ground approach recognizes the
sanctity of the home and parent-child relationship while still providing a mechanism for
protecting children who are alleged victims of abuse and neglect.
This approach is also consistent with current practice in many states. As
discussed above, Texas requires workers to obtain a court order if the parent refuses to
allow the child to be interviewed or examined. 107 The court will issue an order on “good
cause shown.” The statute could be amended to lower the standard to “reasonable belief”
106

One group that is particularly well-organized in their opposition is the Home School Legal Defense
Association. Many parents who home-school their children do so because of a distrust of the public school
system and some may harbor suspicions about the government in general. They are particularly opposed to
social worker investigations because they believe that government officials will treat them less favorably
than other families because of the government’s perceived negative opinion of home-schooling families.
See Comment, Standard Bearers of the Fourth Amendment: The Curious Involvement of Home School
Advocates in Constitutional Challenges to Child Abuse Investigations, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 137 (Fall 2004).
See also cases in Yuracko, Education Off the Grid (discussing HSLDA legal challenges).
107
Texas Family Code at § 261.303(b); see discussion infra Part I.B.
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for all court orders in abuse and neglect situations, or a separate statute could be drafted
to address situations in which the worker has a “reasonable belief” but does not have
evidence that rises to the level of probable cause. 108 If only the lower standard can be
met, the court could issue an order authorizing a more limited search and seizure. Rather
than give the worker broad authority to conduct an interview or inspection, the order
could limit the place, duration, and scope of the interview or observation of the child. 109
IV.

Special Needs Exception to the Warrant Requirement

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable government intrusion.110
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding whether the search of a home or the seizure
and interview of a child in the course of a child abuse or neglect investigation violates the
Fourth Amendment if the search or seizure is conducted without a warrant supported by
probable cause. Some states have regulations authorizing warrantless searches or
seizures in specified circumstances, but state law cannot authorize conduct that violates
the United States constitution.
Many state courts and federal district and appellate courts have addressed this
issue but have not reached uniform conclusions. A few have held that the “special needs”
exception to the warrant requirement applies in child abuse investigations. Others reject
the exception because of law enforcement involvement in such investigations. Confusion
persists because the United States Supreme Court has not weighed in on the issue.
The Supreme Court recognized the special needs exception to the warrant requirement in
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 111 In that case the Court upheld a warrantless search of a student’s
purse by public school officials. 112 While students retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy while at school, the Court recognized that requiring a warrant before searching
students suspected of possessing contraband or otherwise violating rules designed to
promote order or protect student safety would pose an undue burden on the schools. 113
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding
108

It should be noted that some courts have already held that “reasonable cause” in family court
proceedings is equivalent to probable cause in criminal proceedings. Tennenbaum v. Williams, 862 F.Supp.
962, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). To the extent that the court treats “reasonable cause” as requiring the same level
of proof required to meet the probable cause standard, my proposal represents a change. If the court
recognizes that reasonable cause is a lower standard, I simply agree with that court’s assertion.
109
The statute merely states: “If admission to the home, school, or any place where the child may be cannot
be obtained, then for good cause shown the court having family law jurisdiction shall order the parent, the
person responsible for the care of the children, or the person in charge of any place where the child may be
to allow entrance for the interview, examination, and investigation.” Texas Family Code at § 261.303(b).
The statute does not place any limitations or restrictions on the workers once the order has been obtained.
110
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
111
469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
112
Id. at 340. “Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when ‘the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,’ Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S., at 532-533, 87 S.Ct., at 1733, we hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant
before searching a student who is under their authority.” Id.
113
Id.
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that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain
order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the
search has violated or is violating the law. 114
The test for Fourth Amendment compliance was “reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.” In order to be reasonable, the search must be justified at its
inception and must be conducted in a manner that is “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 115
The exception to the warrant requirement will not apply if the policy justifying
the search is impermissibly intertwined with the goals of regular law enforcement. 116 In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 117 the staff of a public hospital collaborated with the
police to draft and enforce a policy that routinely collected urine samples of pregnant
women suspected of drug abuse. 118 The policy was intended to deter drug abuse and to
encourage the pregnant women to enter substance abuse treatment if necessary. 119 In
order to facilitate and encourage the women to pursue counseling or avoid drugs, positive
drug test results were shared with the police and the women were threatened with
prosecution. 120 Women who failed more than one drug test or who failed to complete the
substance abuse program were arrested and prosecuted. 121 Several women filed suit
alleging that the policy violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, they
alleged that the tests were conducted without consent and without a warrant and thus
constituted a violation of their right to be free from unreasonable government searches. 122
The Supreme Court noted: (1) that the hospital staff members were government actors
and (2) that the urine tests constituted searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 123 The hospital argued that no warrant was necessary because the searches
fit within the special needs exception to the warrant requirement. The Court disagreed,
noting that in each of the previous cases in which the special needs exception was
invoked the “special need” that was advanced was “divorced from the State’s general
interest in law enforcement.”
[T]he central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception
was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse
treatment. This fact distinguishes this case from circumstances in which
114

Id. at 341.
Id; see also Roe, 299 F.3d 395, 40 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26
(1987)).
116
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 71.
119
Id. at 70-71.
120
Id. at 72.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 76.
115
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physicians or psychologists, in the course of ordinary medical procedures
aimed at helping the patient herself, come across information that under
rules of law or ethics is subject to reporting requirements, which no one
has challenged here. 124
Given the use of law enforcement to enforce the policy and the “extensive involvement of
law enforcement at every stage of the policy,” 125 the case was outside of the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Although drug abuse was
acknowledged to be a grave problem, “[t]he Fourth Amendment's general prohibition
against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily applies to
such a policy.” 126
Some courts have held that child abuse or neglect investigations trigger the
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 127 However, the
majority of circuits addressing the issue have cited Ferguson as justification for rejecting
the special needs exception. Specifically, they note that law enforcement is often
intimately involved in abuse and neglect investigations as a matter of policy and practice.
Search and seizure of a child from a home
In Gates v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services 128 (TDPRS)
the plaintiffs brought suit against TDPRS and other government entities alleging
violations of their constitutional rights. 129 The claims were based on actions taken in
response to a call from a school official to the state abuse and neglect hotline. 130 In the
call, the school official described various forms of punishment that one of the plaintiffs
used to discipline his son Travis, who was a student at the school. 131 Travis suffered from
severe psychological disorders, including an eating disorder that caused him to steal and
consume large amounts of food. 132 The plaintiff and the school had conflicting views on
how best to manage Travis’ behavior and the report to the hotline indicated that at least
some school officials believed that the plaintiff’s disciplinary techniques crossed the line
to abuse. 133
In response to the hotline call, TDPRS initiated an investigation. During the
course of the investigation, Travis was interviewed at his school then moved to the Child
124

Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 84.
126
Id. at 86. “While respondents are correct that drug abuse both was and is a serious problem, ‘the gravity
of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose.’” Id. (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43). See, e.g.,
Chandler, 520 U.S., at 308, 117 S.Ct. 1295; Skinner, 489 U.S., at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402.
127
See Darryl H. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902-903 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that reasonableness, not probable
cause, is test for whether visual search of child without parental consent violates the Fourth Amendment).
128
537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008).
129
Id. at 412.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
125
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Advocacy Center (CAC) for a videotaped interview. 134 Based in large part on the
information gained during the interview of Travis, TDPRS workers, accompanied by
deputies from the sheriff’s department, went to the plaintiff’s home to interview Travis’
eleven siblings. 135 When they arrived at the home, the housekeeper allowed the TDPRS
workers into the home and they began to interview the other children. 136 The plaintiff
arrived home shortly after and demanded that the TDPRS workers leave. 137 They refused
to leave and ultimately removed all of the children from the home and placed them in
foster homes. 138 A Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship was filed three days
later. 139 A hearing was conducted later that day and the court ordered the children to be
returned to their parents. 140 The case against the plaintiffs was dismissed seven months
later. 141 Over the next three years, TDPRS investigated two other reports of suspected
abuse involving plaintiff’s children. 142 No charges were brought as a result of those
investigations. 143
The plaintiffs filed suit against alleging, among other claims, that their Fourth
Amendment rights were violated with the TDPRS employees entered their home without
a warrant. 144 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the Fourth Amendment
applies to civil investigations conducted by social workers and generally prohibits
government entry into a home without a warrant supported by probable cause, consent, or
exigent circumstances. 145 It further acknowledged that the Supreme Court has recognized
a few circumstances in which “special needs” beyond the general interest in law
enforcement justifies a warrantless search. 146 The defendants alleged that the housekeeper
consented to their entry and that the special needs exception applied to their search of the
home as part of a child abuse investigation. 147
The court determined that there was a fact issue regarding whether the
housekeeper consented to the TDPRS employees’ entry into the house, 148 and held that

134

Id. at 413. The Child Advocacy Center was established for the purpose of coordinating child abuse
investigations among TDPRS, law enforcement, and the district attorney’s office. Id. By conducting
interviews in a central location, children were spared the trauma of multiple interviews by various
government entities. Id.
135
Id. at 413-14.
136
Id. at 414. The TDPRS representatives claimed that the housekeeper consented to their entrance into the
home. The housekeeper denied that she gave consent. Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 415.
139
Id. These events, including the removal of the children, took place on a Friday afternoon. The suit was
filed and the hearing was held on the next business day, which was Monday. Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 416.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 419.
145
Id. at 420 (citing Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services, 299 F.3d 395, 401 (5th Cir.
2002).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 420-21.
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there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry. 149 The court then
considered whether the special needs exception to the warrant requirement applied. It
ultimately concluded that the exception did not apply and the plaintiffs had alleged a
constitutional violation.150 “Key to the special needs doctrine . . . is that the need must be
divorced from the purpose of law enforcement.” 151
Texas law requires TDPRS to notify law enforcement of all child abuse reports
and to conduct joint investigations if the report of abuse alleges that the child is at risk of
immediate physical or sexual abuse. 152 In the case under consideration, the court noted
that the entry into the plaintiffs’ home to investigate the allegation of child abuse “was
closely tied with law enforcement.” 153 Consequently, “because the need to enter the
Gateses’ home was not divorced from the state’s general interest in law enforcement,
there was no special need that justified the entry.” 154 Some other circuits addressing the
issue have reached the same conclusion. 155 Others have left open the possibility that the
special needs exception could apply in some child abuse investigations. 156 The Second
Circuit falls into the latter category, stating: “There may be circumstances in which the
law of warrant and probable cause established in the criminal setting does not work
effectively in the child removal or child examination context.” 157
The court’s conclusion in Gates that the state’s interest in preventing child abuse
goes “beyond” law enforcement but is not “divorced” from it was paramount in its
decision not to apply the special needs exception. According to the Fifth Circuit, because
the interests are both present, the standard probable cause test must be met instead of the
lower standard of reasonableness that would apply if the special needs doctrine applied.
However, the interest in law enforcement exists precisely because child abuse is viewed
149

Id. at 422.
Id. at 423-24.
151
Id. at 423.
152
Id. at 423. The court cited its holding in Roe that “the special need doctrine did not permit a social
worker to visually search a child’s body cavities as part of an abuse investigation without a warrant or
exigent circumstances. In reaching that conclusion, we noted that Texas law requires TDPRS to notify law
enforcement of all child abuse reports.” Id. (internal citations omitted). See also discussion infra at Part I.B.
153
Id. at 424.
154
Id.
155
See Roska ex. Rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We find no special need that
renders the warrant requirement impracticable when social workers enter a home to remove a child, absent
exigent circumstances.”); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Officials may remove a
child from the custody of its parent without prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess
at the time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent
danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that
specific injury.”); See also Silven v. Indiana Dept. of Child Svcs, 635 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that
a seizure of a child from his home is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes if it is pursuant to a court
order, or supported by probable cause, or if exigent circumstances exist).
156
Tennenbum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the court would “refrain from
deciding categorically”, that the special needs exception could never apply to a case in which a child was
removed from his or her home during the course of a child abuse investigation)
157
Id. at 604. The Seventh Circuit has not expressly rejected application of the special needs exception in
child abuse investigations, but dicta in Doe v. Heck indicates that it would do so if the case were presented
to the court. 327 F.3d 492, 517 note 20 (7th Cir. 2003).
150
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as particularly heinous and is directed at society’s most vulnerable citizens. Ironically,
this interest in punishing child abusers makes it more difficult to prevent child abuse.
While this may be appropriate from a Fourth Amendment perspective, it leaves
vulnerable children with less protection. This is especially true in cases in which there is
some evidence of abuse but insufficient evidence to support issuance of a warrant.
It is not clear that the Supreme Court truly requires the state’s interest to be
completely separate from law enforcement. In Ferguson, law enforcement was
“extensively” involved in the development, implementation, and enforcement of the
policy. 158 It does not follow that any tangential law enforcement involvement
automatically prevents a policy or interest from coming within the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Indeed, the Court
distinguished the policy at issue in that case from circumstances in which health care
professionals incidentally come across evidence of illegal activity in the course of their
treatment of a patient. 159 In those cases, the health care workers may be required to
report their findings to law enforcement officials. However, that does not make the
treatment subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Consequently, despite
use of the term “divorce,” the Court itself did not require a complete separation from any
possible law enforcement involvement.
If, instead, the “primary purpose” standard is applied, then the special needs exception
could be applied in child abuse or neglect investigations.
The special needs doctrine is reserved for exceptional circumstances to
justify a search designed to serve non-law enforcement ends. Whether the
special needs doctrine applies depends upon the purpose of the law or
policy in issue. If the primary purpose is ordinary law enforcement, the
special needs doctrine does not apply and the search cannot be upheld
under the doctrine. However, once a non-ordinary law enforcement
purpose is identified, the court conducts a reasonableness test balancing
the individual's privacy interests against the government's special need. 160
The primary purpose of child abuse investigations is ensuring the health and wellbeing of children. 161 Prosecution of parents or caregivers is not automatic nor is it the
focus of such investigations. The investigations and consequent searches are intended to
determine whether the allegations or suspicions of abuse or neglect are well-founded. 162
158

Ferguson, U.S. 67 at 84.
Id. at 80-81.
160
US v. Sczubelek, 255 F.Supp.2d 315 (D. Del. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
161
“Child Protective Services (CPS) is a specialized component of the broader public welfare system of
services to children and families. The purpose of these procedures is to define the intervention process
when a report of referral is received from the community expressing concerns that a child is or may be
maltreated and the Department’s response to those concerns. Community concerns received by the
Department will be evaluated to identify families in need of protective services consistent with laws and
policies pertaining to child maltreatment and the risk of maltreatment.” Illinois Reports of Child Abuse and
Neglect Procedures, § 300.10.
162
See, e.g., id.
159
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If so, the focus then becomes protecting the children from further abuse or neglect and
providing a safe environment for the children, either in foster care, with relatives, or in
the home with support services provided by the state.
It is true that state laws regulating child abuse investigations may overlap
significantly with law enforcement regulations. 163 This entanglement may is intended to
reduce the need for duplicate investigative work or to minimize trauma to victims. For
example, in some states victims are interviewed by social service investigators and police
officers jointly or in a central location to avoid requiring the victim to undergo multiple
interviews or relate traumatic events multiple times. The regulations are also intended to
ensure that evidence collected by social service workers can be used at trial against the
abuser. 164 However, statutes can be revised to reduce entanglement, particularly at the
initial stages of an investigation, if doing so will allow the special needs exception to
apply. If a report of abuse or neglect is received but there is insufficient evidence to
support issuance of a warrant, state law may be revised to allow for a limited, warrantless
search or seizure of the child.
Law enforcement would only participate at this stage if it was deemed necessary
for the protection of the alleged victim or the investigator. Even then, they would not
participate in the interview and, if possible, would not be present for any actual
discussion. Instead, once the child’s and investigator’s safety was assured, the law
enforcement officer could leave, remain outside of the home, or move to another room.
This would ensure that they are not involved in the search and seizure although, if
necessary, they would be available if the situation turned violent. To the extent that social
workers fear for their safety, it should be made clear to officers that their presence is
solely for the purpose of protecting the social worker. 165 If law enforcement officers are
present under those circumstances, and even if they assist in the searches, their presence
is intended to protect the investigator and, if necessary, the children; thus criminal
prosecution is not the primary purpose of their involvement. They are not there for the
purpose of gathering evidence to be used against the parents, although that may be an
incidental result. To view the primary purpose are law enforcement is to assume that the
focus is on punishing the parent rather than protecting a child.
This clarification and limitation of the law enforcement role would minimize any
concern that the primary purpose of the investigation is law enforcement. Information
gathered may still be turned over to police, but only if such information is evidence of a
crime. In this respect, such searches are analogous to the results of medical tests being
turned over to police if the results are relevant to a criminal investigation. 166 The purpose
of the tests is diagnosing and treating illness. The fact that the information may be used
in a criminal investigation does not negate or overshadow that purpose.
163

See discussion infra, Part I.A.
Id.
165
If, after arriving at the interview or investigation site, it becomes apparent that children are in danger,
the officer’s role may expand to include protection of the child (by removal of the child, if exigent
circumstances exist).
166
See discussion in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80-81 (2001).
164
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Search and seizure on private property other than the home
The Seventh Circuit has rejected the special needs exception in the context of
searches at private schools. 167 In Doe v. Heck, social workers were notified that corporal
punishment was being used as a form of discipline at a private Christian school and that
such discipline may have been abusive in some instances. 168 Child Welfare caseworkers
interviewed a former student whose guardian filed the complaint and she identified
another student, eleven-year-old John Doe, Jr., who she believed had also been
spanked. 169 Caseworkers then went to the school and demanded that the school allow
them to interview John about the corporal punishment he was alleged to have received
and other family matters. 170 The principal objected to the interviews without a warrant or
parental consent, but the caseworkers ignored the objection and removed John from his
classroom and interviewed him. 171 The caseworkers relied on a Wisconsin statute, as well
as the advice of the attorney for the Bureau and the local district attorney’s office, when
they informed the school principal that they did not need a warrant or parental consent to
interview the school’s students as part of their investigation. According to the statute:
The agency may contact, observe, or interview the child at any location
without permission from the child’s parent, guardian or legal custodian if
necessary to determine if the child is in need of protection or services,
except that the person making the investigation may enter a child’s
dwelling only with permission from the child’s parent guardian or legal
custodian or after obtaining a court order. 172
The Child Welfare Bureau sought to interview other students on a different
occasion but the principal refused to allow access to the caseworkers. 173 Having
unsuccessfully attempted to interview John’s siblings and parents or obtain sufficient
corroborating information, the Bureau eventually ended its investigation. 174 John’s
parents and the school filed suit against three caseworkers, alleging various constitutional
violations. 175
167

Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003). The initial report was made by the great-grandmother of a
former student. The great-grandmother was also one of the child’s guardians and she reported that her
great-granddaughter had been spanked by the school’s principal twice and after the second spanking the
child had bruises on her back. Id. at 500. She and her husband disagreed with the school’s corporal
punishment policy and withdrew the child from the school. Id. The great-grandmother reported the
incidents to Child Welfare out of concern for her great-granddaughter and the other children at the school
who were being spanked. Id. She had also reported the spankings to the police who informed her that
nothing could be done since she had not taken any pictures of the bruises on the child. Id. at 500-501.
168
Id. at 499.
169
Id. at 502.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 502 (quoting Wis. Stat. at § 48.981(3)(c)1).
173
Id. at 505-506
174
Id. at 508.
175
Id. In addition to their Fourth Amendment claims, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit initially concluded that the investigation on the private
school’s premises was undoubtedly a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.176
Moreover, John was “seized” when the caseworkers removed him from his classroom
and placed him in another room to be interviewed. 177 Thus, the only issue was whether
the search and seizure were reasonable in the absence of a warrant or parental consent. 178
The court noted that the Supreme Court has distinguished between warrantless searches
and seizures on public versus private property and held that they are presumptively
unreasonable when carried out on private property unless they fall within a recognized
exception. 179 “Moreover, the principle that a warrantless search or seizure conducted on
private property is unreasonable applies . . . so long as the claimant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the premises on which the search or seizure occurred.” 180
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Does had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the private school premises. 181 Consequently, the search and seizure were
unreasonable unless some recognized exception applied. 182 The defendant caseworkers
relied on two Seventh Circuit cases, Darryl H. v. Coler and Landstrom v. Illinois, in
which the court held that warrantless strip searches of students on school premises did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. 183 However, as the court in Doe pointed out, those
searches occurred on public school property with the consent of public school
administrators.
The Seventh Circuit then cited its holding in Brokaw v. Mercer County 184 that
seizure of a child on private property is unreasonable unless the government obtains a
court order supported by probable cause or if exigent circumstances exist. 185 “[I]t is
Brokaw, not Darryl H. or Landstrom, that controls our decision in this case.” 186 Since the
court had already concluded that the record “clearly shows that the defendants’ search of
the school and seizure of the child were not done pursuant to a court order, probable
cause, or exigent circumstances,” 187 the search and seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment. The court went on to hold that the statute upon which the caseworkers
relied was unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized “government officials to
conduct an investigation of child abuse on private property without a warrant or probable
cause, consent, or exigent circumstances.” 188
176

Id. at 510.
Id. “[W]e conclude that John Jr. was ‘seized’ with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because no
reasonable child would have believed that he was free to leave the nursery.” Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 511.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 512.
182
Id. at 513.
183
Id. at 513-14 (citing Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir .1986) and Landstrom v. Illinois Dept. of
Children & Family Services, 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1990)).
184
235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).
185
Id. at 514.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 513.
188
Id. at 515-16.
177
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The Seventh Circuit was careful to note that since the defendants did not contend that the
special needs exception applied to the case, the court was not deciding whether the
exception could apply. 189
Nevertheless, given that the exigent circumstances exception already gives
the State the ability to take immediate action to ensure the physical safety
of a child suspected of abuse who is located on private property, there is
no apparent justification for carving out a ‘special needs’ exception for
child abuse investigations in this context.190
Thus, although they did not expressly do so in Doe v. Heck, the Seventh Circuit has
strongly signaled that they are likely to reject the special needs exception in child abuse
and neglect investigations conducted on private property if the issue is presented for
decision.
Search and seizure in public schools
While the Fourth Amendment applies to children in public (as opposed to private)
schools, 191 the scope of protection is less than that which is enjoyed in the home. 192
Nevertheless, in the context of child abuse and neglect investigations, some courts have
held that a warrant, probable cause, or parental consent are required before a child can be
searched or seized on public school property. 193 Others, such as the Seventh Circuit, have
applied a more lenient rule. 194
In Greene v. Camreta, the plaintiff had been arrested and charged with sexually
abusing F.S., who was the child of family friends. 195 The parents of the alleged victim
claimed that the plaintiff’s wife had expressed concern regarding the plaintiff’s
interactions with their own daughters. 196 In response to this information, social services
workers went to the plaintiff’s older daughter’s school and requested to speak to her. 197
The social worker was accompanied by a law enforcement officer. 198 School
administrators pulled the daughter out of class, led her to an empty room, and left her
with the social worker and police officer. 199 The social worker asked questions while the
officer stood by armed but silent. 200 The social worker claimed that the daughter made
statements indicating that she had been sexually abused by her father. 201 She later
189

Id. at 513.
Id. at 517 note 20.
191
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
192
See id. at 341.
193
See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).
194
See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
195
Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1016.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 1017.
199
Id.
200
Id. The child stated that she was not scared by the officer and that she trusted him. Id.
201
Id.
190
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claimed that she made the incriminating statements only after being pressured to do so by
the social worker. 202 The children were temporarily removed from their parents’ custody,
and the plaintiff went to trial for abusing F.S. and his daughter. 203 The jury was unable to
reach a verdict and the plaintiff accepted a plea bargain with respect to the charges with
respect to F.S. 204 The charges regarding the alleged abuse of his daughter were
dismissed. 205
The plaintiff filed suit against the social worker alleging that the seizure of his
daughter in the school violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 206 The defendant social
workers relied on the Court’s holding in T.L.O. that the traditional warrant requirement
does not apply in the school setting. 207 The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, noting
that the circumstances of T.L.O. were very different from the circumstances in
Camreta. 208 In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the “special need” recognized by the Court in
T.L.O. was the need for efficient and effective discipline. 209 No such need compelled the
interview (seizure) of the child in Camreta. 210 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit pointed out
that the Supreme Court noted that it was expressing no opinion about searches conducted
by, on behalf of, or in conjunction with law enforcement personnel. 211
The court then analyzed whether the special needs exception should apply in the
context of child abuse investigations at school. 212 The court ultimately held that the law
enforcement purpose and involvement in the seizure were too pervasive to allow the
court to apply the special needs exception. 213 “[T]he Court hasn’t relaxed traditional
Fourth Amendment protections when the main purpose of an ostensibly administrative
search was to gather evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings, or when law
enforcement personnel were substantially involved in the design and implementation of
the administrative program.” 214
In Camreta, the law enforcement officer was present during the interview of
plaintiff’s daughter. 215 Moreover, the plaintiff had already been arrested and charged with
sexual abuse of F.S. and the investigation in connection with that case was ongoing. 216
Thus, the interview was intended not only to determine whether plaintiff’s daughters had
been or were in danger of being abuse, but also to gather evidence that could be used in
202

Id.
Id. at 1019-20.
204
Id. at 1020.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 1022.
207
Id. at 1023.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 1024.
210
Id. at 1025.
211
Id. at 1024.
212
Id. at 1025.
213
Id. at 1027.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. “Once the police have initiated a criminal investigation into alleged abuse in the home, responsible
officials must provide procedural protections appropriate to the criminal context.” Id. at 1030
203
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the trial on the charges of abusing F.S. 217 Finally, the Oregon statutory scheme revealed a
“broader entanglement of law enforcement and social services officials in the state’s
investigations of child abuse.” 218
Since the special needs exception did not apply, the Ninth Circuit applied the
traditional Fourth Amendment standard and concluded that the seizure, which occurred
without a warrant or equivalent court order, without exigent circumstances, and without
parental consent, was unconstitutional. 219 The Ninth Circuit noted that it was not deciding
whether the special needs doctrine could apply in the absence of a direct law enforcement
purpose and without law enforcement involvement. 220
In Tenenbaum v. Williams, 221 a kindergarten teacher reported that her student,
Sarah, might have been sexually abused. 222 The report was based on statements that
Sarah made to the teacher indicating that her father had hurt her and the fact that the child
pointed to the groin area of a doll when asked where he hurt her. 223 Social workers
removed Sarah from her public school classroom and took her to a hospital for
examination by a pediatrician and gynecologist to determine whether there was evidence
of sexual abuse. 224 No evidence of abuse was found and Sarah was returned to her
parents. 225 The further action was taken against the Tenenbaums and the claims were
designated “unfounded.” 226
The Tenenbaums brought suit against the social worker, supervisor, and others
involved in the investigations. 227 Among the claims was the allegation that by removing
Sarah from school and taking her to the hospital for examination, the social workers
violated Sarah’s Fourth Amendment rights. 228 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the actions
constituted a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes. 229 Since it was undisputed that
217

Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1028.
219
Id. at 1030.
220
Id. at 1027 note 12.
221
193 F.3d 581 (10th Cir. 1999).
222
Id. at 588.
223
Id. at 588.
224
Id. at 591. Before taking this step, the social workers visited the Tenenbaums at their home and
interview the parents. They also examined Sarah and her brother’s partially unclothed bodies for evidence
of abuse; none was found. Id. at 589. The children were left with their parents that evening. Id. Four days
later the supervisor decided to have Sarah removed from school and examined for evidence of sexual abuse
at the hospital after the social worker met with Sarah’s teacher who confirmed the information contained in
the initial report made to social services. Id. at 590. The supervisor’s decision was also based on the fact
that he believed the Tenenbaum’s ignored the command to call his office, which he believed showed that
they were not taking the sex abuse allegations seriously. Id. The Tenenbaums claimed they were never
instructed to call his office. Id. Moreover, it was undisputed that when the social workers visited their
home, they asked only about Sarah’s developmental delays and her habit of falling asleep in class. Id. At
the supervisor’s insistence, they were not told of the sexual abuse allegations. Id.
225
Id. at 591.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 581.
228
Id. at 602.
229
Id. at 602.
218
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no warrant or equivalent court order was obtained before the seizure, the question was
whether, “the ordinary probable-cause standard applicable to, among others, law
enforcement officials making warrantless arrests also apply to caseworkers seizing
children without prior court authorization.” 230
The court considered whether the special needs exception should apply, thereby
relieving the caseworkers of the need to establish probable cause or obtain a warrant. 231
After noting the split among the circuits on this issue, the Tenth Circuit declined to
answer the question definitively but refused to apply it in the Tenenbaum case. 232 “There
may be circumstances in which the law of warrant and probable cause established in the
criminal setting does not work effectively in the child removal or child examination
context. This is not such a case.” 233 Thus, the Tenth Circuit has held open the possibility
that the special needs exception could justify warrantless searches or seizures in the child
abuse investigation context, although it did not elaborate on the facts that would support
such a holding.
The Seventh Circuit has refused to require a warrant or probable cause before a
child can be searched on public school grounds. 234 In Darryl H. v. Coler, the plaintiffs
sought injunctive and monetary relief for alleged constitutional violations. Specifically,
they sought enjoin enforcement of Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) policy that allowed caseworkers to conduct warrantless “physical examinations
of [a] child’s body for evidence of abuse.” 235 The Illinois policy at issue was articulated
in a Handbook and policy memorandum. 236
According to the Handbook, five criteria (“hot-line criteria”) must be met in order
for DCFS to investigate an allegation of abuse or neglect. 237 If the hot-line criteria are
met, the caseworker must conduct an investigation, which may include an examination of
the child to verify allegations of abuse. 238 If a physical examination is to be conducted,
the caseworker has the option of (1) requiring the caretaker to take the child to a
physician for examination; (2) taking the child to a physician for examination; (3)

230

Id. at 603.
Id. at 603-04.
232
Id. at 604.
233
Id. at 604.
234
Darryl H., 801 F.3d at 902.
235
Id. at 894. Note that the Handbook guidelines discussed in Part I of this Article are a revised version of
the procedures discussed in Darryl H.
236
Id. at 895.
237
Id. Those five criteria are (1) a child less than eighteen years old is involved; (2) the child was either
harmed or in danger of harm; (3) a specific incident of abuse is identified; (4) a parent, caretaker, sibling or
babysitter is the alleged perpetrator of neglect; or (5) a parent, caretaker, adult family member, adult
individual residing in the child’s home, parent’s paramour, sibling or babysitter is the alleged perpetrator of
abuse. Id.
238
Id. at 896.
231
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disrobing the child and conducting a cursory physical examination while the caretaker is
present; or (4) permitting the school nurse to examine the child. 239
In the case of one of the plaintiffs, DCFS caseworkers received an anonymous
report that B.D. had been beaten by his father. 240 The caseworker went to B.D.’s school
and conducted and examination of B.D. in which the boy was required to remove his
pants so that the caseworker could examine his back and buttocks. 241 The other plaintiff’s
case involved a call by a child’s mother to DCFS seeking family counseling. 242 During
the call the mother disclosed that her husband had kicked and shoved her son, A.O., who
was her husband’s stepson. 243 A caseworker later went to A.O.’s school and examined
A.O. for evidence of abuse. 244 During that examination, A.O. was required to remove his
shirt and pants. 245 In neither case did the caseworker have a warrant or parental consent
to conduct the examinations. 246
The plaintiffs claimed that both examinations violated the Fourth Amendment and
they sought to enjoin DCFS from searching children without parental consent or probable
cause. 247 The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction based, in part, on
its finding that while the examinations were searches that implicated the Fourth
Amendment, the searches were reasonable and, therefore, constitutional. 248 The Seventh
Circuit agreed that the examinations were Fourth Amendment searches, and agreed with
the district court with respect to the reasonableness of the searches. 249 “On this record,
we believe that the district judge was correct in holding that the searches in question here
could be conducted without meeting the strictures of probable cause or the warrant
requirement.” 250 However, the court was not willing to go so far as to hold that any
search conducted in accordance with DCFS policy would be reasonable. “[W]e are
somewhat less convinced, at least on this record, that a nude body search may be
constitutionally conducted in every instance in which the hot-line criteria are met.” 251
Beyond noting in the recitation of facts that the searches at issue took place in
school, the court did not discuss the constitutional implications of that location. It did not
discuss the diminished expectations of privacy in school as opposed to the home,
239

Id. In cases of alleged sexual abuse, a physician must conduct the examination. Id. If the child is over
the age of thirteen, the caseworker conducting a physical examination must be of the same sex as the child.
Id. If the child is severely ill, the child must immediately be seen by a physician. Id.
240
Id. at 897.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
It is unclear whether a “caretaker” was present during the examinations as required by the policy, but
this issue was not raised in the opinion.
247
Id. at 897.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 901.
250
Id.
251
Id. Note that DCFS policy now requires parental consent or a court order to conduct a strip search of a
child over the parent’s objection. See discussion infra, Part I.A.
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although it did note that other plaintiffs that were a part of the case in the district court
alleged that home searches violated the Fourth Amendment but none of those plaintiffs
was a part of the instant appeal. 252 Thus, the court made it clear that it was not deciding
whether a home search consistent with DCFS policy was constitutional. 253 Because the
location of the search was not discussed in depth as part of the Fourth Amendment
analysis, it is unclear to what extent the fact that the searches took place in school
influenced the court’s decision that the search was reasonable.
While the Seventh Circuit did not expressly address the special needs
exception, 254 it did address concerns about law enforcement involvement in the
searches. 255
[W]hile the visual inspection of the child’s body may eventually result in a
criminal proceeding against a child abuser, that contingency is certainly of
secondary importance to the DCFS at the time the search is conducted. Of
prime importance is the safety of the child, and the stabilization of the
home environment. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the
Constitution requires that a visual inspection of the body of a child who
may have been the victim of child abuse can only be undertaken when the
standards of probable cause or a warrant are met. 256
Strip searches
After concluding that a warrant was not necessary to conduct a strip search of a
child in Darryl H., the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that this conclusion did not provide
a resolution of the question. 257 Specifically, the court had to determine whether the DCFS
policies as set out in the Handbook ensured that searched conducted in accordance with
those policies would always be reasonable. 258 The relevant inquiry was whether the
search was justified at its inception and whether “the conduct of the search ‘reasonably
related to the scope of the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.’” 259
The court was most concerned with whether searches authorized by the Handbook
would always be justified at their inception. 260 The court noted that the Handbook did not
require caseworkers to seek other sources of information in order to verify abuse
252

Id. at 896 note 2.
Id.
254
T.L.O. had only been decided a year earlier and the term “special needs” had not yet been widely used,
nor had the exception been developed beyond the facts of that case.
255
Id. at 903.
256
Id. at 902.
257
Id. at 902.
258
Id. at 903. “[W]e must now assess whether this record supports the conclusion of the district judge that,
criteria contained in the Handbook ensure that, under all circumstances, the searches conducted by the
DCFS are reasonable.” Id.
259
Id. at 903 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).
260
Id. at 903.
253
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allegations, even when they had the time and opportunity to do so. 261 “Nor do we
understand why the caseworker cannot be instructed to make, as time and circumstances
permit, at least some effort to verify reports which are received from minors, anonymous
callers, or sources whose reliability may be reasonably suspect.” 262 Additionally, the
court was concerned that the Handbook made no attempt to distinguish between searches
of the very young and searches of older children. These concerns led the court to
conclude that at that preliminary stage of litigation “we are not convinced, on the basis of
the record before us, that the Handbook as it now exists, ensures that the searches will
always be reasonable.” 263 In other words, while the Handbook criteria would lead to
reasonable searches in some cases, there might be circumstances in which such searches
would be unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Warrantless strip searches were categorically rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Roe
v. TDPRS. 264 In June 1999 the Texas Children’s Protective Services (“CPS”) Statewide
Intake Unit received a call concerning Jackie, a young child who was alleged to have
been seen acting in a manner that indicated that she might have been sexually abused. 265
The case was assigned to Strickland, who eventually contacted Mrs. Roe, Jackie’s
mother. 266 Strickland informed Mrs. Roe that she had received a referral regarding
Jackie, although she would not discuss the details and insisted that they talk in person. 267
They agreed that Strickland would visit Mrs. Roe’s house the next morning.
The next morning Strickland arrived at the home explained the call that had been
received and the purpose of her visit. 268 When Mrs. Roe asked whether she should
contact an attorney, Strickland assured her that was not necessary. 269 After some
discussion, Strickland told Mrs. Roe that she (Strickland) needed to take some pictures of
Jackie, although she did not specify what type of pictures. Mrs. Roe was not given the
option of refusing to allow the pictures or examination. Strickland, who had no training in
taking pictures of children’s genitalia, asked Mrs. Roe to remove Jackie’s upper clothing.
Mrs. Roe complied and Strickland checked her for marks and bruises but found none.270
Strickland then asked Mrs. Roe to remove Jackie’s underwear. 271 Mrs. Roe questioned
the necessity of such action but Strickland assured her that it was more stressful for Mrs.

261

Id. at 903.
Id. at 903.
263
Id. at 904. Because the plaintiffs could potentially establish that the Handbook criterial were not
reasonable under all circumstances, the court concluded that there was some likelihood that the plaintiffs
could succeed on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim. Id.
264
299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002).
265
Id. at 398. While attending day camp, Jackie was alleged to have been seen touching the “private parts”
of another six-year old girt, kissing the girl on the lips, and dancing in a sexually suggestive manner. Id.
266
Id. at 398.
267
Id. at 399.
268
Id. Mrs. Roe claimed that Strickland entered the home without permission or an invitation; Strickland
claimed that she was invited to enter. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that Mrs. Roe consented to the entry. Id. at
402.
269
Id. at 399.
270
Id.
271
Id.
262
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Roe than for Jackie. 272 Strickland then took pictures of Jackie’s internal and external
vaginal and anal areas. 273
After taking the pictures Strickland interviewed Jackie for fifteen to twenty
minutes, had a brief discussion with Mrs. Roe, then left. 274 CPS ultimately “ruled out”
abuse and closed the case. 275 The incident caused Jackie to have frequent nightmares and
anxiety, for which she received counseling. 276 Mrs. Roe and Jackie’s father, Mr. Doe,
sued Strickland and the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services
(“TDPRS”) on Jackie’s behalf, 277 claiming that the search of Jackie without a court order
violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 278
The Fifth Circuit noted that it had not previously addressed whether the special
needs exception applied to a social worker’s visual search of a child’s body cavities and it
acknowledged that while the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, there was a split
among the other circuits that had confronted it. 279 The court then examined the cases in
which the Supreme Court had applied the special needs exception and attempted to
determine whether strip searches in child abuse investigations fit within that category of
cases. 280
The court first recognized that strip searches implicate fundamental Fourth Amendment
rights. 281 “The Court has never upheld a ‘special needs’ search where the person’s
expectation of privacy was as strong as is Jackie’s interest in bodily privacy.” 282 The fact
that the search occurred in her home only strengthened the privacy interest. 283 The
entanglement of law enforcement tipped the scales issue in Jackie’s favor. 284 Citing
Ferguson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Court would not recognize the special
needs exception in a case in which the “special need” is not “divorced” from a general
law enforcement purpose. 285
Strickland ultimately fails to identify a “special need” separate from the
purposes of general law enforcement. Identifying the goal of protecting a
child’s welfare and removing him from an abusive home is easy;
disentangling that goal from general law enforcement purposes is difficult.
272

Id.
Id. “Strickland took pictures of Jackie’s vagina and buttocks in a closed position, and then instructed
Mrs. Roe to spread Jackie’s labia and buttocks, so that she could take pictures of the genital and anal
areas.” Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id. Mrs. Roe also experienced symptoms of depression following the incident. Id.
277
Id. at 398.
278
Id. at 400.
279
Id. at 403.
280
Id. at 404.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 406.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
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. . . Texas law describes social workers’ investigations as a tool both for
gathering evidence for criminal convictions and for protecting the welfare
of the child. Ferguson teaches that we must apply the traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis where a child protective services search is so
intimately intertwined with law enforcement. 286
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that a social worker must obtain a warrant or court
order supported by probable cause, parental consent, or face exigent circumstances to
justify a strip search of a child. 287
V.

Warrantless but Reasonable Searches (Not Special Needs)

In theory, even if the special needs exception is not applied, a warrantless search
may be conducted without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 288 Just as the
Supreme Court adopted an alternative to the warrant standard in T.L.O. (that later became
known as the special needs exception), the Court could simply adopt a warrantless
standard that applies to child abuse and neglect cases. The decision to adopt the
alternative standard rather than simply apply the special needs exception could reflect the
unique conflict created by the role of law enforcement in abuse and neglect cases and the
compelling interest of the state in protecting children. The advantage to this approach is
that the Court could spell out the circumstances in which a warrantless search would be
justified and perhaps even outline the permissible scope of such a search. Above all, the
search would still need to comply with the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, social workers would still need to establish that the warrantless search
or seizure was reasonable.
If the Court does not provide guidance with respect to what circumstances would
justify a warrantless search or seizure and the scope of such a search or seizure,
regulations or case law could be developed to guide investigators regarding reasonable
and unreasonable investigative conduct. Even absent such specific guidelines,
investigators can use judgment informed by the reality that warrantless searches and
seizures must be used only as a last resort, when justified by the circumstances, and
limited in such a way as to make it reasonable in all respects.
Last resort
If the investigator can investigate without entering the home or interviewing the
child, those steps should be taken first. For example, if the child attends school the social
worker can and should interview teachers or other school personnel who have had the
opportunity to observe the child. Other sources of information such as pre-school or day
286

Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 407-08.
288
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a police officer has a right to conduct a limited,
warrantless search and seizure of suspects when he has “reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime”);
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (extending the protective search doctrine to the interior of
automobiles).
287
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care workers, church members, neighbors or friends may be able to provide sufficient
information to either close the investigation or support issuance of a warrant. Parents can
also be interviewed to explain or respond to the allegations. Absent a warrant, none of
these sources can be compelled to cooperate with the investigations but if they choose to
cooperate, search of the child may not be necessary.
Justified by the circumstances
If other sources fail to provide sufficient information and there is still insufficient
evidence to obtain a warrant, the investigator must evaluate the evidence that is available
and determine whether it is sufficient and credible enough to justify further action. For
example, the source of the allegations may have questionable credibility but the
allegations are specific and detailed and could be easily corroborated or disproved by a
cursory examination of the child. If so, a warrantless search or seizure may be
appropriate. Specifically, if the only avenue available to investigate the allegations is to
interview the child, then such an interview may be reasonable even without parental
consent and even if the interview takes place in the home.
Reasonable in all respects
In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment, the interview must be reasonable
in all respects, including the time, place, duration and scope. The interview should
normally take place during the day, in a place where the child is comfortable, and should
be limited to questions relevant to the allegations that triggered the investigation.
Likewise, any visual inspection should be conducted only if the report of abuse alleged
physical injury and should be limited to the area alleged to have been injured. For
example, if the report claims that the child has bruises on his arm, the child could be
required to roll up his sleeves so that the social worker can examine his arms. The social
worker could not, however, require the child to lift his pant legs or his shirt for
examination of the legs or torso. 289
The interview should be as brief as possible and the parent or guardian may be
allowed to be present during the interview. In short, the interview should be treated as a
fact finding mission aimed at minimizing the intrusion on the child’s privacy interests
and emotional well-being and not an interrogation aimed at getting to the truth at all
costs. While not all injuries will be visible and a child might be less forthcoming in the
presence of the parent, serious abuse may be apparent and provide enough information to
allow the caseworker to get a warrant to conduct more intrusive searches or seizures. It
may also uncover other sources of information that might provide information to
289

The exception would be the child’s genital regions. If sexual abuse is alleged, the social worker should
only be allowed to inspect the child’s genitals pursuant to a warrant or probable cause. Such searches
should only be conducted by specially trained medical professionals in the presence of a parent or guardian,
so long as the parent or guardian does not interfere with the examination. If the child is verbal and able to
understand the nature of the allegations and need for the examination, the child’s consent should be sought
and the child should be able to identify a trusted adult (other than an alleged perpetrator) who can
accompany the child during the examination. This might also be an appropriate situation for requiring a
court order based on reasonable suspicion. See discussion infra, Part III.
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corroborate either the abuse allegations or corroborate the parents’ denial that the child
has been abused or neglected. Likewise, the worker may be able to determine that a child
has not been abused or neglected and the case may be closed. Undoubtedly, there will be
times when a limited search or seizure yields no useful information. However, there is no
perfect solution and limited searches are likely to uncover the most severe abuse or
obvious neglect when there are no other sources of information available while still
respecting the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
On the other hand, a more intrusive search—such as a strip search or search of a
child’s genitals—will usually be unreasonable. Moreover, a search of a home based
solely anonymous, vague allegation of abuse or neglect may not be reasonable. While
hidden scars or evidence of sexual abuse will not be uncovered in these situations, more
intrusive examinations would likely be unreasonable under the circumstances. Moreover,
obvious signs of abuse or neglect could be detected and serve as the basis for a warrant
for a more thorough (and intrusive) investigation.
It must also be noted that state actors should be held accountable for the way in
which interviews or searches are conducted. A reasonable search can be conducted in an
unreasonable manner. A search that might be reasonable during daylight hours might be
unreasonable in the middle of the night. An interview conducted in a hostile tone with
several persons unknown to the child may be unreasonable even though the same
interview in a gentler tone with fewer persons present may be reasonable.
Another possibility if an abuse allegation is made and the parents will not consent
to an interview with the child, is to require the parents to get a signed physician’s
statement verifying that the child does not bear any signs of neglect or abuse. The
parents can choose the physician (subject to some restrictions—i.e. not one of the parents
or an immediate relative) and no government official need be present at the examination.
The physician need not submit any findings, test results, or information beyond a
statement that there are no signs of neglect or abuse. The cost of the examination may be
paid by the state (perhaps subject to reimbursement if evidence of neglect or abuse is
discovered).
This is still a search, and it does infringe on an expectation of privacy, but it is a
limited intrusion that may meet the requirement of “reasonableness” in circumstances in
which there is no other way for social workers to investigate abuse allegations. The
conclusions of the physician need not be dispositive of the allegations, but may provide
sufficient evidence of abuse or refute allegations of abuse in some cases. In any event, it
would provide more information and at least potentially dispense with the need for a
search of the home or interview with the child.
The parents or guardians also could be required to submit to an interview with the
social services representative, either at the home or some other location. This could
qualify as a search and seizure, if participation is mandatory (i.e., they are not free to
leave), although it is less likely to be considered a seizure if they are allowed to leave,
even if leaving triggers some other consequence. Abuse and neglect investigators would
36
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be allowed to question parents or guardians to allow them to provide evidence or
explanations to refute abuse allegations. Denials alone would not necessarily result in
closing the case, but the interviews could provide other information or evidence that
could be used to further the investigation or even support issuance of a warrant.
Conclusion
The inevitable conflict between protecting children from abuse or neglect and
protecting the privacy rights of the parents who might be guilty of inflicting that abuse or
neglect creates a situation in which there are no easy answers. However, an approach that
relieves child abuse and neglect investigators of the burden of establishing probable cause
before interviewing or examining alleged victims while limiting the scope of the
investigation or requiring a court order issued based on reasonable suspicion strikes a
balance necessary to accommodate the interests of all concerned without sacrificing the
safety and well-being of vulnerable children.
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